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1.  The identity condition 
 
 It is well-known that ellipsis is subject to an identity condition, according to which 
the content of an ellipsis site E needs to be ‘recoverable’ from a linguistic antecent A in 
the discourse. In recent years the nature of this identity relation has been the subject of 
much discussion in the literature, with some authors taking the relation to be semantic 
(Merchant 2001, Hartman 2009, AnderBois 2011) and others taking it to be syntactic 
(Chung, Ladusaw and McCloskey 1995, Chung 2005, Merchant 2008).  
Arguments for the semantic approach are often substantiated by evidence for non-
isomorphism between E and A; for instance, Merchant (2001: 22) observes that gerunds 
can antecede sluices in infinitival clauses, even though E and A mismatch with respect to 
verbal morphology and the presence of infinitival auxiliary to.  
 
(1)  [Decorating for the holidays]A is easy if you know how [to decorate for the 
holidays]E  
 
To account for such syntactic non-isomorphisms, Merchant proposes a semantic identity 
condition called eGIVENness, where identity holds under mutual entailment: A entails E 
and E entails A, modulo !-type shifting. This allows A and E to differ from each other 
with respect to lexical content, while still imposing a high degree of semantic 
isomorphism upon them. Such lexical mismatches are difficult to account for in 
approaches that impose syntactic identity upon ellipsis: if identity is defined over phrase 
markers, then non-identity in terms of lexical items would typically entail non-identity 
between E and A. 
 Arguments for a syntactic identity condition have tended to focus on cases where 
the relation between A and E is seen to be quite strict, with slight syntactic differences !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* I thank and absolve Klaus Abels, Nigel Fabb, Jeremy Hartman and Caroline Heycock. 
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which would not normally affect the calculation of eGIVENness apparently causing 
identity failures. For instance, Chung (2005) shows that in languages with p-stranding, 
sluicing cannot leave prepositions stranded in E that are not also found in A:  
 
(2)  Mary was flirting, but they wouldn’t say *(with) who. 
  
Given that the choice between pied-piping and p-stranding doesn’t seem to have clear 
semantic consequences (mutual entailment holds in both cases), the obligatoriness of 
pied-piping in (2) is somewhat mysterious for a semantic identity approach. Chung argues 
that such data motivate a lexical condition on ellipsis identity: the numeration that forms 
E must be a proper subset of A. Given that numerations are syntactic constructs, we may 
say this is a syntactic identity relation.  
Proponents of the syntactic identity approach may account for lexical mismatches 
between E and A by showing that syntactic identity does in fact hold between E and A at 
some level of abstraction. An example of this reasoning can be found in Merchant’s 
(2010) analysis of mismatches with respect to polarity items, as in (2):  
 
(3)  John didn’t [see anyone]A, but Mary did [see someone]E. 
 
Merchant adopts the proposal in Giannakidou (2007), in which the indefinites in E and A 
are in effect different morphosyntactic realizations of the same polarity-unvalued 
indefinite DP in different syntactic contexts. This DP spells out as the PPI someome in 
polarity positive contexts – defined by features on a higher polarity projection, "P – and 
as the NPI anyone in negative contexts; given this, the two DPs are sufficiently similar to 
ensure that syntactic identity holds between E and A. If lexical mismatches like (1) and 
(3) can be explained in these terms, and examples like (2) are taken to motivate a lexical 
identity condition above and beyond semantic identity, it would be tempting to conclude 
that syntactic identity should indeed be imposed by something like Chung’s lexical 
identity requirement.  
 In this paper I argue against lexical identity as a strong requirement on ellipsis, 
and instead I motivate an alternative semantic identity requirement. The empirical focus 
of this paper is tolerated lexical mismatches between E and A, where the mismatches in 
question cannot be explained away in terms of environment-specific alternations (as with 
3) or semantic identity in terms of mutual entailment; this includes cases where lexical 
items are in E but not in A and cases where lexical items are in A but not in E. These 
mismatches argue strongly against strict syntactic identity as imposed by the lexical 
identity requirement (Chung 2005) or the LF Copy theory (Chung, Ladusaw and 
McCloskey 1995), as well as the strict semantic isomorphy imposed by eGIVENness 
(Merchant 2001). I argue instead for a semantic identity relation that compares neo-
Davidsonian representations of meaning in order to calculate ellipsis identity (developing 
proposals in Hardt 2005). This has similar effects as the lexical identity condition, in that 
it restricts cases where additional elements are introduced in E that are not in A; however, 
I argue that additional antecdents may sometimes be accommodated into the context by a 




2.  Lexical mismatches between E and A 
2.1  In E but not in A: modals 
 
As noted by Merchant (2001), the ellipsis site in sluicing can differ from its antecedent 
not just with respect to the presence of infinitival to (as in 1), but also with respect to the 
presence or absence of other auxiliary-like elements such as modal verbs. Consider: 
 
(4)  A: Amuse me! 
      B: What with should I amuse you? 
 
Here the inversion of preposition and wh-phrase (‘swiping’) unambiguously diagnoses 
sluicing in B’s reply (Lasnik 2001), and it is clear that the interpretation assigned to the 
sluice is one where the modal verb should is present in the ellipsis site. The antecedent for 
this sluice is an imperative that lacks this lexical item entirely; although the imperative 
may contain a covert modal operator that has a similar semantic import to the modal 
auxiliary in the sluice (see e.g. Schwager 2006), it is clear that the two are different 
lexical items given that they have different phonological and syntactic properties.  
Sluices with imperative antecedents thus present clear examples of lexical 
mismatches between E and A where an element in E is not found in A. Merchant (2001: 
23) shows that a similar phenomenon can be seen with antecedents other than 
imperatives: in German subjunctive clauses provide antecedents for sluices that include 
modals that are not present in A:  
 
(5)  Poltiker    würden      gern helfen aber sie  wissen nicht, wie !.  
      politicians would.subj prt   help    but  they know   not    how 
   
 “Politicians would like to help but they don't know how” 
       a. ! " *wie zu helfen 
                     how to help 
       b. ! " wie sie gern helfen würden  
     how they prt help   would.subj 
       c. ! " wie sie gern helfen sollten 
    how they prt help    should  
       d. ! = wie sie helfen sollten  
                 how they help should  
 
(5a) is ruled out because German lacks wh-infinitives (cf. English 1), and (5b) is ruled out 
as possible interpretations for the ellipsis site; rather, the only licit interpretation is (5d), 
where E contains a modal not contained in A.1 The subjunctive form of the auxiliary in A 
provides the same sort of semantic import as the finite modal auxiliary in E (both are 
operators that introduce quantification over possible worlds), so the possibility of ellipsis 
with such lexical mismatches is not surprising under a semantic identity approach.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Note that the the unavailability of (5c) and preference for (5d) provides evidence for the kind of mismatch 
discussed in the next  subsection, where a lexical item is in A but not in E; here, the element in question is 
the particle gern.  
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All of these cases of modal mismatches constitute direct counterexamples to 
Chung’s lexical identity approach to ellipsis licensing, since in all cases the numeration of 
E is not a proper subset of the numeration of in A. It is hard to see how these mismatches 
may be explained in terms of environment-specific syntactic alternations (as with 
Merchant’s account of 3), since there are a number of non-trivial syntactic differences 
between the mismatching auxiliary elements that are not obviously derived from the 
surrounding syntactic environments.  
 
2.2  In A but not in E 
2.2.1  Missing adverbs 
 
It is typically assumed that the identity relation between E and A is total; that is, all 
constituents contained within A are interpreted in E, since the ellipsis identity relation is 
one of isomorphy. Thus in examples like (7), the ellipsis sites are interpreted as having 
the same adverbial modification in them as the antecedents: 
 
(7)  a. John always turns up late, and I want to know why he *(always) turns up late 
       b. Someone shouted loudly, and I want to know who shouted *(loudly) 
 
There are some cases of VP-ellipsis where VP-adjuncts can be left out of the 
interpretation of the ellipsis site, as in (8a); this is presumably because the identity 
relation can select a lower segment of the VP (to the exclusion of the segment where the 
adjunct is adjoined) for ellipsis-identity (see Sag 1976, Merchant 2000). Interestingly, 
these intepretations are only licit when the adjunct in question is contrasted with an 
analogous adjunct in the antecedent; when this condition is not met, the option to interpret 
the ellipsis site as omitted the adverbial is lost, as in (8b). 
 
(8)  a. John called the police on Sunday, and I did on Tuesday.  
       b. John called the police on Sunday, and I did call the police *(on Tuesday), too. 
 
One possible analysis is that the default choice is to interpret the maximal segment of the 
VP; when this interpretation is illicit (as it would be for 8a), one can select the lower 
segment as the antecedent.  
 While this analysis in terms of lower and higher segments may account for the 
VP-ellipsis facts, there are a number of related cases where adjuncts are omitted from E 
even though there is not a segment of A that can be selected that omits the adjunct. This is 
seen in (9)-(10):  
 
(9)  a. Children always learn a language without knowing how. 
       b. Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain... announced that Britain would blindly 
follow America into Afghanistan without questioning why. 
(from http://guardian.150m.com/hufschmid/Manipulation.html) 
 
(10)  John is probably running late, although I don't know why. 
 
 
First consider (9), which are both examples of what Yoshida (2010) calls “antecedent 
contained sluicing.” In these examples the antecedents contain the VP-adverbs always 
and blindly, and yet it is clear from interpretation that the sluices are not interpreted as if 
they are modified by these adverbs: the sluice in (9a) may be paraphrased as “how they 
learn it,” and the one in (9b) as “why they following them into Afghanistan.” The 
situation is familiar from (8b): interpreting the sluice as being modified by the adjunct 
would be infelicitous (e.g. one cannot question why one does something blindly), so the 
interpretation for the ellipsis site is one that excludes it. However, this example cannot be 
given a segment-based analysis, since the antecedent is minimally an IP in sluicing and 
the adverb is a VP-modifier; rather, it seems that the adverb has just been missed out.2  
 The same sort of missing adverb effect is seen in the more straightforward sluice 
in (10). It is clear from the interpretation that the ellipsis site does not contain the adverb 
contained in the antecedent: it is interpreted as “… why he is running late.” As with (9), 
this seems to obtain because interpreting the adverb in the ellipsis site would lead to ill-
formedness; questions are generally resistant to hosting epistemic adverbs (Jackendoff 
1972), as can be seen from the oddness of (11):  
 
(11)  ??Why is John probably running late? 
 
As with (9), (10) is not amenable to a segment-based reanalysis, since the adverb is 
adjoined to a position below the auxiliary in T. This is straightforward evidence against 
any approach to ellipsis identity that assumes that the relation is isomorphic, whether 
syntactic (e.g. Chung et al 1995) or semantic (e.g. Merchant 2001, Hartman 2009).  
 
2.2.2  Missing PPs 
 
A similar set of mismatches between E and A can be seen in certain classes of fragment 
answers, where XPs contained in the question seem to be omitted from the structure of 
the fragment answer. The background for this is Merchant’s (2004) ellipsis approach to 
fragment answers: Merchant provides a wealth of evidence for analysing fragment 
answers as elliptical sentences, where the fragment has been fronted to a sentence-initial 
position and the full TP has been elided under identity with the question. Evidence for 
this comes from connectivity effects, such as bound variable readings of pronouns: 
 
(12)  Q: Which of hisi relatives does [every boy]i like? 
         A: Hisi mother. 
         A’: Hisi courage [every boy]i likes t 
 
It is typically assumed that bound variable readings are only available when the pronoun 
can be c-commanded by the binding QP at LF; this may hold after A-bar reconstruction, 
as in the question in (12). Given this, the availability of the bound reading in the fragment 
answer indicates that the proper analysis for the fragment is (12A’), where it has 
undergone A-bar focus-fronting followed by ellipsis. Further empirical arguments for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 But see Yoshida (2010) for something like a segment-based analysis of sluicing cases where something 
smaller than an IP is interpreted as the antecedent. I leave it for future work to explore how exactly 
Yoshida’s data may be handled by the approach to ellipsis identity developed here. 
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movement and ellipsis account come from Case-matching, p-stranding, selection and 
island sensitivity.  
With this as background, consider question-answer pairs like (13)-(14): 
 
(13) Q: What do you admire about John? 
        A: His courage. 
        A’: His courage I admire t 
 
(14) Q: What does every boy’si mother dislike about himi? 
        A: Only hisi ego. 
        A’: Only hisi ego every boy’si mother dislikes t 
 
On the ellipsis analysis, the questions provide the linguistic antecedents for the clausal 
ellipsis in the fragment answers in (13)-(14); (13) is a simple case, and (14) is a case 
where variable binding ensures that an ellipsis analysis is required.3 However, these both 
seem to involve mismatches between E and A, since the about PPs in the questions do not 
seem to be part of the fragment answers: such PPs cannot co-occur with the DPs 
corresponding to the fragment answers in the corresponding full declarative.  
 
(15)  a. *I admire his courage about John. 
b. *Every boy’si mother dislikes only hisi ego about himi. 
 
Given that the PPs are contained within the VP in the question, and the TP is the minimal 
antecedent for clausal ellipsis, this seems to be another situation where an adjunct in E is 
not retained in A. The well-formedness of (13)-(14) thus provides further evidence 
against strict identity between E and A, where lexical items in A are not present in E.  
 
2.2.3  Expressive modification 
 
The final case of lexical mismatches between E and A that I will consider involve 
expressives, in particular adverbial modifiers like fucking. Potts (2007) argues that 
expressives are indexicals, with the expressive force of the term typically anchored to the 
speaker in the same way as person, and he proposes that the semantic contribution of such 
expressions must be located in a dimension of meaning that is additional to that which 
defines truth-conditional content. The point of interest here is that the expressive force of 
an antecedent does not need to be borne by a dependent elliptical element. To see this, 
consider the following dialogues:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The only modification of the fragment ensures that the fragment answer must be given a clausal ellipsis 
analysis and not one where the fragment is underlyingly an elided reverse pseudocleft; such an analysis for 
(13) is illustrated in (i). Only modification is not compatible with the pivot position of a pseudocleft 
(Heycock 2008), as shown by (ii) so the well-formedness of (14) indicates that such an analysis is not 
possible. This needs to be ruled out since reverse pseudoclefts tolerate the presence of the about PP, cf.(i); 
otherwise the argument for the “missing PP” may be undermined. 
 
(i) His courage is what I admire about John. 
(ii) ?*Only his ego is what every boy’s mother dislikes (about him). 
 
 
(16)  A: You should fucking fire that asshole John! 
         B: I know you think I should !, but I won’t ! as I like him. 
 
(17)  A: You should tell that fucking dog to shut the hell up? 
         B: Why !? The poor little pup just wants some attention. 
 
In both of these dialogues, B is not committed to the expressive force encoded by A’s 
statement, as evidenced by the felicity of the empathetic follow-ups. This indicates that E 
lacks the expressive content of A in both cases, thus implicating significant lexical 
mismatches with respect to expressive content. It is important to note that the mismatches 
seen here cannot all be attributed to the mechanisms of “vehicle change” (Fiengo and 
May 1994), since this only applies to the indexical properties of nominals. Given that the 
modifier fucking and the hell are adverbial modifiers in these contexts, these expressions 
cannot be exchanged for corresponding pronominals by vehicle change in the same way 
as nominals. It should be noted that the lexical mismatches in (16)-(17) are not a problem 
for semantic approaches to ellipsis identity like Merchant’s (2001) eGIVENness, at least 
if Potts’ multidimensional approach to expressives is correct: eGIVENness is defined 
over truth-conditional meaning, so it correctly allows for mismatches with respect to 
expressive content. However, it is so well not handled well by the LF Copy approach to 
syntactic identity, as this imposes strict syntactic isomorphy between E and A.  
 
2.3  Summary 
 
In this section I have presented data that demonstrates that an ellipsis site E can differ 
substantially from its antecedent A with respect its lexical content. We have seen both 
cases where there are lexical items in E that are not present in A, and cases where lexical 
items are in A but not in E. We have also seen that this data presents problems for all the 
major theories of ellipsis identity: Chung’s (2005) lexical identity condition cannot 
handle the data from modals; Merchant’s (2001) semantic isomorphy approach cannot 
handle the missing adverb and missing about PP data; Chung et al’s (1995) LF Copy 
approach cannot handle any of the data, at least not without significant revision.  
Given that Chung’s lexical identity condition is supplemented by the semantic 
eGIVENness condition (see Chung 2005: 11), we can surmise that, of the three theories 
reviewed here, the purely semantic identity condition is best suited to dealing with the 
lexical mismatches. An important characteristic of the data that troubles the semantic 
identity approach is that the mismatches between E and A occur when strict isomorphy 
would lead to ungrammaticality or infelicity in the ellipsis sentence; for instance with the 
cases of missing epistemic adverbs in (10), including the adverbs in E would lead to 
semantic ill-formedness. It seems, then, that although the default is for semantic 
isomorphy, non-isomorphy is allowed as a “last resort” when isomorphy fails. In the next 
section I develop a specific implementation of the semantic identity condition which is 
able to account for this “last resort” accommodation of non-isomorphy.  
 
 
3.  Reformulating semantic identity 




As a starting point, let us consider again Merchant’s (2001) eGIVENness proposal in 
more detail. Recall that a constituent E is eGIVEN if its existential closure is in a mutual 
entailment relation with the existential closure of an antecedent constituent A; that is, A 
entails E and E entails A. An important characteristic of this proposal is that part of it – in 
particular, the first part of the biconditional – has generality beyond ellipsis, since 
eGIVENness is an ellipsis-specific version of the general relation of GIVENness, as 
defined by Schwarzschild (1999) (building on Rooth 1992). GIVENness is the condition 
that needs to be met for a constituent to be deaccented, and Merchant (2001) shows that 
this condition is weaker than the one that applies to ellipsis: A must entail E for a 
constituent to be GIVEN, while E must also entail A for a constituent to be eGIVEN. 
This difference between ellipsis and deaccenting is shown by the difference between the 
two with respect to what is called implicational bridging, as demonstrated by the 
following (from Merchant 2001: 27):4  
 
(18) a. JOHN was reading the book while BILL was reading, too. 
        b. JOHN was reading the book while BILL was !, too.  
        ! " reading 
        ! = reading a book 
 
(18a) demonstrates that deaccenting allows for non-isomorphism between the antecedent 
and the deaccented constituent with respect to argument structure, where the deaccented 
constituent D is an optionally intransitive version of the antecedent A; this is allowed the 
entailment relation that defines GIVENness allows for such loosneness (that x was 
reading something entails that x was reading).5 However, this is not available for ellipsis, 
as indicated by (18b): here the intransitive reading is not available, and so implicational 
bridging seems to be unavailable. Merchant’s proposal to deal with this asymmetry 
between deaccenting and ellipsis, while retaining the intuition that the two are ultimately 
derived from common mechanisms, is thus to impose for ellipsis the additional condition 
that E must entail A; this results in the biconditional of mutual entailment, where “A 
entails X” is defocussing-general and “X entails A” is ellipsis-specific.  
 While Merchant’s reasoning is sound, we may still question the choice to define 
the ellipsis-specific condition in eGIVENness in terms of entailment. There are a few 
reasons to do so. First, Hartman (2009) shows that, in the domain of ellipsis identity, 
mutual entailment is somewhat problematic, since it predicts identity between 
constituents which logically entail one another but which otherwise bear no syntactic 
resemblance to each other. This is the case with relational opposites:  
 
(19) *John will beat someone at chess, and then Mary will lose to someone at chess. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Small caps indicate focal stress and small-type italics indicate deaccenting. 
5 The approach in Fox (1999) is different: Fox argues that syntactic isomorphy is required between A and 
D, and proposed instead that accommodation is responsible for making available additional antecedents, 
where accommodation is an inferencing process that proceeds on the basis of accommodation-seeking 
material in the discourse. I adopt a version of Fox’s accommodation theory in what follows to account for 
the availability of additional antecedents for ellipsis identity; however I do not think it is necessary to adopt 
Fox’s approach to deaccenting (where the A implies D/E relation is abandoned).  
 
 
Mutual entailment between E and A holds in (19) – someone being beaten entails 
someone losing and vice versa – ellipsis is not possible with the interpretation shown. 
This indicates that the semantic relation of entailment is somehow too loose to properly 
describe the ellipsis-specific part of the ellipsis identity relation,6 even though it has 
utility in describing deaccenting. Second, we can see that the cases of lexical mismatches 
that were not handled by eGIVENness typically involved failure of the ellipsis-specific 
condition E entails A. Consider again (9a), where an adverb is present in A but not in E:  
 
(9a) Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain... announced that Britain would blindly 
follow America into Afghanistan without questioning why. 
 
Informally, the proposition denoted by A, that Britain would blindly follow America into 
Afghanistan, entails the proposition denoted by E, that Britain would follow America into 
Afghanistan, but the opposite does not hold: that x does something does not entail that 
someone does it blindly, and so E does not entail A in (9a), even though ellipsis identity is 
possible. Thus it seems clear that the data discussed here requires a reformulation of the 
second part of the semantic identity relation, not the first part. Finally, we may note that 
other arguments that have been assimilated for a semantic approach to ellipsis identity 
implicate the A entails E relation but not the E entails A relation. For example, AnderBois 
(2011) argues for a specific implementation of eGIVENness where the relevant semantic 
isomorphy holds not just over truth-conditional meaning, but also over issues in the sense 
of Groenendijk and Roelofson (2009). AnderBois argues for this on the basis of ellipsis 
identity failures in cases where the antecedents are double negatives or contained in 
appositives,7 where mutual entailment holds over truth-conditional content and yet 
ellipsis identity is not possible; he argues that the failure obtains because in the relevant 
cases, A does not entail E in terms of issues (specifically, the relevant content of the 
antecedent is not at issue content). I will not dwell on AnderBois’ arguments here since 
they may take us too far afield, but what is important is that the E entails A relation again 
plays no role, in that his theory does not invoke this relation in its description of the data.8 
We may conclude, then, that the E entails A relation is what needs to be replaced in our 
reformulation of the ellipsis identity relation. 
 
3.2  The proposal 
 
I retain the assumption that ellipsis and deaccenting are both subject to the condition of 
GIVENness, which holds that the antecedent A must entail the reduced constituent E/D. 
Adopting ideas in Hardt (2005), I propose that the ellipsis-specific condition of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Hartman (2009) proposes a return to the two-part condition on ellipsis licensing proposed by Rooth 
(1992), where strict semantic identity is imposed for some variable assigment. The proposal that I develop 
here is very similar, although I employ different notation for the sake of making the treatment of 
accommodation much simpler. 
7 AnderBois also considers voice mismatches and argues that a large cut of this data also follows from this 
approach. I do not consider this data here since I take the analysis of voice mismatches to be an open and 
thorny issue. 
8 Anderbois’ theory thus predicts that the identity failures he describes for ellipsis should also obtain for 
deaccenting. This seems correct to me, although the data is not as clear as it is in the case of ellipsis. 
Gary Thoms 
 
ellipsis identity relation is a strict semantic identity condition that holds over neo-
Davidsonian representations of meaning (Parsons 1990, Pietroski 2005). However, 
adopting proposals in Fox (1999), I propose that the identity relation may hold either 
between E and A or between E and A’, where A’ is an additional antecedent that is 
accommodated into the context on the basis of manipulation of A by a process Hardt 
(2005) calls Conjunct Elimination (which I return to shortly). This is in (20):  
 
(20)  For a constituent E to be elided,  
         a. an antecedent A must entail E (i.e. E must be GIVEN) 
         b. E = A or A’, where A’ is an accommodated variant of A 
(where E, A and A’ are neo-Davidsonian representations under existential closure) 
 
To see how this is implemented, consider the simple example in (21) and the illustration 
of the relevant information in (22):  
 
(21)  John [kissed the dog]A and Mary did [kiss the dog], too. 
 
(22)  A: KISS(e) & Patient(dog,e) 
         E: KISS(e) & Patient(dog,e) 
         A ! E and E = A 
 
Since A entails E and the meaning of E is identical to that for A, both conditions of (20) 
are satisfied and ellipsis is possible. This has the same effect as other semantic identity 
relations, such as those invoked in Rooth (1992) and Hartman (2009). This approach 
captures all of the basic results of Merchant’s semantic identity relation: it imposes 
semantic identity, not identity over phrase markers or lexical items; it imposes identity 
over truth-conditional meaning, thus allowing for mismatches between E and A with 
respect to expressive content; it accounts for phenomena like vehicle change in broadly 
the same way.9 However, it has two additional benefits which are not shared by the 
mutual entailment approach: (i) it imposes a strict semantic isomorphy that has broadly 
the same effect as a lexical identity condition, and (ii) it allows us to define clearly an 
operation for deriving additional antecedents from the linguistic context provided by the 
antecedent. I will illustrate these two points in turn.  
 
3.2  Semantic identity as lexical identity 
 
One immediate outcome of (20) is that it correctly rules out the cases of relational 
opposites like (19), which we saw were not ruled out by eGIVENness. To illustrate, 
consider the simplified representations for E and A in (19): 
 
(23)  A: BEAT(e) & Patient(x,e) & AT-CHESS(e) 
         E: LOSE-TO(e) & Patient(x,e) AT-CHESS(e) A ! E, E " A,  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 I assume that the implementation of slightly more complex representations (such as ones involving 
pronouns and bound variables) is trivial; I leave interrogation of this assumption for future work. 
 
What this illustrates is that the condition in (21) imposes some degree of lexical identity 
between E and A, since at the very least the two must contain the same basic predicates in 
order for the identity relation to be satisfied. This also has the effect of ruling out cases of 
implicational bridging like (24), which are possible for deaccenting but not for ellipsis 
(Merchant 2001: 15): 
 
(24)  a. *ABBY ate a sandwich after BEN did eat lunch 
        b. ABBY ate a sandwich after BEN ate lunch 
 
Identity does not obtain in (24a) because the arguments of the verbs are semantically 
distinct in E and A, thus producing non-identity between E and A as defined in (20). The 
condition thus has the effect of standardly ruling out semantically contentful lexical 
mismatches between E and A, at least in standard cases. Of course, (20) does not impose 
strict lexical identity between E and A; for instance, it would allow for identity between 
an ellipsis site containing an imperative and an antecedent containing a modal, so long as 
the imperative contains some form of operator that derives the same sort of interpretation 
as the modal (Schwager 2006). The important thing is that the lexical items in E must be 
matched by items in A that provide the same contribution to truth-conditional meaning; 
mismatches with respect to inflectional morphology and semantically inert functional 
categories are thus predicted not to affect whether or not identity is possible. 
 An important outcome of this strict semantic identity condition is that it may give 
us an explanation of the p-stranding data from Chung (2005), illustrated in (2) and 
repeated here:   
 
(25)  Mary was flirting, but they wouldn’t say *who she was flirting with. 
 
This shows that the sluice is ungrammatical when a preposition that is not present in A is 
stranded in E; the well-formedness of its pied-piped equivalent (“sprouting,” 2) shows 
that the problem here is just with the preposition in the ellipsis site. The analysis here is 
simple: the neo-Davidsonian representation of E would contain a conjunct & WITH(x) 
which would have no counterpart in A, so condition (20b) would not be satisfied, while 
the same would not obtain in the pied-piping case since the preposition in question is 
outside of the ellipsis site.10  
 
3.3  Mismatches and accommodation 
 
The key to explaining the lexical mismatches between E and A which were discussed in 
section 2 is condition (20b) of the identity relation, which allows for the accommodation 
of additional antecedents into the discourse context. The notion of accommodation is 
borrowed from Fox (1999), where it is conceived of as a strategy for deriving legitimate 
antecedents for a discourse anaphora relation (i.e. the need for an antecedent for 
deaccenting) when the current discourse context is not adequate. Fox (1999: 7) states the 
following conditions on accommodation:  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This necessarily assumes that the prepositions involved are not functional elements or semantically inert, 
but rather semantically contentful lexical items that may distinguish semantic representations. 
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(28)  a. Accommodation of a new antecedent for S, AC, must have a trigger.  
b. Accommodation has a trigger when S contains accommodation-seeking 
material, i.e. when S contains pronounced non-F[ocus]-marked material which is 
absent in A. 
 
Fox argues that this explains the difference between ellipsis and deaccenting with respect 
to implicational bridging examples like (24): in the deaccenting example, the pronounced 
non-F-marked lunch provides a trigger for accommodation, which in turn produces a 
relevant antecedent (i.e. x ate lunch). Fox argues that this process is constrained by 
economy: it is only invoked in the presence of a trigger, and only when necessary. 
 Here I would like to propose that, in addition to non-F-marked material, the 
antecedent itself can also suffice as a trigger for accommodation. In most cases, where E 
and A are sufficiently similar for identity to hold, accommodation is not required and is 
thus not invoked. However, if E is not semantically identical to A as per (21), then 
accommodation is triggered and inferencing produces additional antecedents on the basis 
of A and other linguistic material in the discourse context, in order to provide an 
appropriate antecedent. Importantly, I propose that accommodation on the basis of A is 
restricted to manipulation of the semantic representation of A, and I propose that this 
manipulation is typically done by process which Hardt (2005) calls Conjunct Elimination 
(CE). Informally, CE involves elimination of a conjunct in a neo-Davidsonian 
representation, as in (29): 
 
(29)  A & B & C    »»»»Conjunct Elimination»»»»   A & B   
 
I assume that the semantic representations provided by CE must be well-formed in 
themselves; thus CE could not eliminate the object of a transitive verb, since the resultant 
representation would not satisfy the theta criterion (or some manifestation of it).  
Finally, I assume that as a semantic-pragmatic strategy (probably derivable from 
Gricean principles), accommodation constrains not only the production of antecedents but 
also the kinds of constituents that are silenced: if E’ could have been used instead of E 
without triggering accommodation (whereby E’ must be identical to A), while conveying 
the same amount of information, the discourse is infelicitous; that is, the availability of E’ 
blocks the use of E. The effect of this overall discourse condition is that accommodation 
is only triggered when semantic isomorphy would lead to ill-formedness: accommodation 
is only triggered when A is not a legitimate antecedent and E’ is not available as a better 
interpretation for the ellipsis site because it would cause ungrammaticality or infelicity.  
This is the effect we saw in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, where an additional non-
isomorphic antecedent A’ was made available because strict isomorphy failed to obtain 
between E and A. To illustrate, consider (9a) once more, repeated here as (30) with minor 
elaboration; (31) provides simplified schematics of the representations of E and A, and 
(32) schematizes how CE produces the additional antecedent A’: 
 
(30)  … Britain would blindly follow America into Afghanistan without questioning 
why Britain would follow America into Afghanistan 
 
 
(31)  A: FOLLOW(e) & Agent(Br,e) & Theme(Am,e) & INTO(Afghan,e) & 
BLINDLY(e) 
E: FOLLOW(e) & Agent(Br,e) & Theme(Am,e) & INTO(Afghan,e)  
 
(32)  A: FOLLOW(e) & Agent(Br,e) & Theme(Am,e) & INTO(Afghan,e) & 
BLINDLY(e) 
                             »»»» CE of BLINDLY(e) »»» 
A’: FOLLOW(e) & Agent(Br,e) & Theme(Am,e) & INTO(Afghan,e)   
A ! E, E " A.           BUT         A ! E, E = A’      so ellipsis possible 
 
The non-accommodation-seeking E’, which is strictly identical to A, does not block use 
of E here, since E’ is infelicitous and thus not available; as a result, accommodation is 
possible and hence Conjunct Elimination produces the additional antecedent A’ by 
eliminating the conjunct which specifies the adverbial that is present in E but not in A.  
This derives the missing adverb phenomenon and the fact that it is restricted to 
applying only when strict identity is infelicitous. The same explanation can be carried 
over for the missing PP data, the other remaining challenge for semantic identity. The 
mechanisms of accommodation as implemented here thus allow us to account the lexical 
mismatch data which troubled the semantic identity approach, thus providing us with a 
full account of the lexical mismatches in §2.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have shown that ellipsis sites and their antecedents can differ substantially 
with respect to lexical content, and I have argued that the data reviewed present strong 
challenges to a number of standard approaches to ellipsis identity, especially those that 
propose that the identity relation is syntactic in nature. On the basis of this I have 
developed an alternative semantic theory of ellipsis identity, where (i) A must entail E, 
and (ii) E must be identical to A or an additional accommodated antecedent A’, where A’ 
is derived by inferencing on the basis of A. I proposed that this semantic identity relation 
holds between neo-Davidsonian representations of meaning, and I showed that such an 
implementation allows us to derive a semantic identity condition that has much of the 
force of a lexical identity condition, while also providing a small degree of flexibility 
which allows us to account for the semantic non-isomorphisms demonstrated by the 
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